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Burkean Minimalism
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
Burkean minimalism has long played an important role in constitutional law. Like
other judicial minimalists, Burkeans believe in rulings that are at once narrow and
theoretically unambitious; what Burkeans add is an insistence on respect for traditional
practices and an intense distrust of those who would renovate social practices by
reference to moral or political reasoning of their own. An understanding of the uses and
limits of Burkean minimalism helps to illuminate a number of current debates, including
those involving substantive due process, the Establishment Clause, and the power of the
President to protect national security. Burkean minimalists oppose, and are opposed, by
three groups: originalists, who want to recover the original understanding of the
Constitution; rationalist minimalists, who favor small steps but who are often critical of
traditions and established practices; and perfectionists, both liberal and conservative,
who want to read the Constitution in a way that fits with the most attractive political
ideals.
No approach to constitutional law makes sense in every imaginable world. The
argument for Burkean minimalism is strongest in domains in which three assumptions
hold: originalism would produce intolerable results; established traditions are generally
just, adaptive to social needs, or at least acceptable; and the theory-building capacities
of the federal judiciary are sharply limited. Burkean minimalists face a number of
unresolved dilemmas, above all involving the appropriately Burkean response to nonBurkean, or anti-Burkean, precedents.
And first of all, the science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intellect,
which, with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, is the collected reason of the
ages, combining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of
human concerns, as a heap of old exploded errors, would no longer be studied.
Personal self-sufficiency and arrogance (the certain attendants upon all those who
have never experienced a wisdom greater than their own) would usurp the
tribunal.
 Edmund Burke1

*

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science,
University of Chicago. I am grateful to Frank Michelman, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Adam Samaha,
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Fried Fund provided financial support. Thanks to the audience at the annual meeting of the Association of
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Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in The Portable Edmund Burke 456-57 (Isaac
Kramnick ed.) (1999).

It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the
people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important
question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to
depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.
 Alexander Hamilton2

I.

Approaches

Consider the following cases:
1. For over fifty years, the words “under God” have been part of the Pledge of
Allegiance.3 Parents object to the use of those words, arguing that under
existing principles, the reference to God must be taken to count as an
establishment of religion.4
2. The President of the United States has long engaged in “foreign surveillance”
by wiretapping conversations in which at least one of the parties is in another
nation and is suspected of being unfriendly to the United States.5 The practice
of foreign surveillance has been upheld by several lower courts, which see
that practice as falling within the President’s “inherent” authority.6 Those
subject to such surveillance argue that as originally understood, the
Constitution is not easily construed to grant such “inherent” authority to the
President.
3. For over seventy years, the Supreme Court has permitted Congress to create
“independent” regulatory agencies—agencies whose heads are immune from
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The Federalist No. 1.
See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 524 U.S. 1, 16 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
4
See id.
5
In federal court, the authority to engage in such surveillance has been asserted for at least thirty-five years.
See United States v. Clay, 4390 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1970). The practice of “national security surveillance”
has been traced to a decision of the Eisenhower Administration in 1954, see Morgan Cloud, The Bugs in
Our System, New York Times, Jan. 13, 2006, at A23, but it appears that such surveillance extends at least
far back as a decision of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1940, see United States Department of Justice, Legal
Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President 7
(January 19, 2006).
6
See US v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F2d 908, 912-15 (4th Cir 1980); US v. Buck, 548 F2d 871, 875-76 (9th
Cir 1977); US v. Butenko, 494 US 881 (3d Cir 1974); US v. Brown, 484 US 418, 426 (5th Cir 1973); In Re
Sealed Case 02-001, 310 F3d 717 (Foreign Intelligence Court of Review 2002).
3
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the plenary removal power of the President.7 The Department of Justice now
attacks the notion of “independence,” arguing that it is inconsistent with the
system of checks and balances under any reasonable understanding of that
system.8
Each of these cases presents a conflict between longstanding practices and what is
plausibly argued to be the best interpretation of the Constitution. Those who challenge
the practices contend that the best interpretation must prevail. A predictable response is
that when construing the Constitution, courts should be closely attentive to longstanding
practices, and must often give deference to the judgments of public officials extending
over time. On this view, constitutional interpretation should be conservative in the literal
sense—respecting settled judicial doctrine, but also deferring to traditions as such.
Those who make such arguments adopt an approach to constitutional law that I
shall call Burkean minimalism.9 Burkean minimalists believe that constitutional
principles must be built incrementally and by analogy, and with close reference to
longstanding practices. Like all minimalists, Burkeans insist on incrementalism; but they
also emphasize the need for judges to pay careful heed to established traditions10 and to
avoid independent moral and political argument of any kind. On this count, Burkean
minimalists should be distinguished from their rationalist counterparts, who are less
focused on longstanding practices, and who are more willing to require an independent
justification for those practices.11 In the nation’s history, Justices Felix Frankfurter and
Sandra Day O’Connor have been the most prominent practitioners of Burkean
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Humphrey’s Executor v US, 295 US 602 (1935).
See Geoffrey Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup Ct Rev 41.
9
A good illustration is Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US 579, 610-611 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For
a concise critique, see Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 444-45 (1990): “[Y]ou cannot
just admire Burke and think you have found a judicial philosophy. Prudentialism is the repeated sounding
of a note of caution (repeated, not consistent – a consistently cautious person would be cautious about
caution as well as about everything else), and a tune with one note soon becomes tedious.” One of my goals
here is to respond to this challenge, with the suggestion that Burkean minimalism is a plausible response to
limited information and bounded rationality on the part of courts and judges.
10
See, for example, the emphasis on the history of executive claims settlement in Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 US 654, 683-86 (1981).
11
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty 69-74 (2005) (emphasizing need for small steps and caution in
the domain of privacy, but doing so with reference to theoretical ideal of active liberty).
8
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minimalism, in the sense that they have tended to favor small steps and close attention to
both experience and tradition.12
Within conservative legal thought, Burkean minimalism is opposed to those who
adopt two alternative approaches. The first is originalism. Originalists, including Justice
Antonin Scalia13 and Clarence Thomas,14 believe that the Constitution should be
understood to mean what it meant at the time that it was ratified. On this view, the
ratifiers’ understanding provides the lodestar for constitutional interpretation. Departures
from that understanding are illegitimate, even if those departures are longstanding. It is
noteworthy that the conservative dissenters on the Warren Court, Justices Frankfurter and
John Marshall Harlan, had strong Burkean inclinations and did not typically speak in
terms of the original understanding.15
The second alternative is conservative perfectionism. Conservative perfectionists
believe that the Constitution’s ideals should be cast in the most attractive light.
Conservative perfectionism is responsible for the attack on affirmative action programs,16
the effort to strike down restrictions on commercial advertising,17 and the movement to
protect property rights against “regulatory takings.”18 Conservative perfectionists are not
greatly concerned with the original understanding of the founding document, and they are
entirely willing to renovate longstanding practices by reference to ambitious ideas about
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See notes supra. Of course there are significant differences between Justice Frankfurter and Justice
O’Connor, to be taken up in due course; and neither justice was always a practionioner of Burkean
minimalism. For example, Justice Frankfurter concurred in Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 US 483 (1954),
and Justice O’Connor concurred in the result in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003).
13
See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 37-47 (1997); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849 (1989).
14
See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified School Dist v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49-53 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) (arguing for return to original understanding of Establishment Clause).
15
See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ v. Barnette, 319 US 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting invalidation of flag salute); Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
joined by Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that constitutionality of reapportionment schemes should be
treated as a nonjusticiable political question). There are exceptions. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US
533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (offering a historical challenge to one person, one vote principle).
16
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 US 306, 364 (Rehnquist, CJ, dissenting) (invoking principle of colorblindness as basis for attack on race-conscious admissions policy).
17
See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comn., 447 US 557 (1980).
18
See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v NYC, 438 US 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (calling
for greater protection against regulatory takings). On the difficulty of finding historical support for this
position, see John F. Hart, Land Use Law in The Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings
Clause, 94 Nw U L Rev 1099 (2000).
4

constitutional liberty.19 The most influential members of the Lochner Court were
conservative perfectionists20; in the last decades, Chief Justice Rehnquist showed an
occasional interest in conservative perfectionism.21
What unifies Burkean minimalism, originalism, and conservative perfectionism?
The simplest answer is that all three disapprove of those forms of liberal thought that
culminated in the work of the Warren Court and on occasion its successors.22 All three
reject the idea, prominent in the late 1970s and early 1980s, that the Supreme Court
should build on footnote four in the Carolene Products decision,23 developing
constitutional law by reference to a theory of democracy24 and protecting traditionally
disadvantaged groups from majoritarian processes.25 All three approaches are at least
skeptical of Roe v. Wade,26 the effort to remove religion from the public sphere,27 and the
attempt to grant new protections to suspected criminals.28 The three approaches count as
conservative simply because of their shared doubts about the rulings of the Warren Court
and the arguments offered by that Court’s most enthusiastic defenders.29
But there are massive disagreements as well. For example, Burkean minimalists
have little interest in originalism. From the Burkean perspective, originalism is far too
radical30; it calls for dramatic movements in the law, and it is unacceptable for exactly
that reason. Burkean minimalists prize stability, and they are entirely willing to accept
19

See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 US 484, 515 (1996)(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
for broad protection of commercial advertising).
20
For evidence, see cases cited in note supra; the Court’s opinions spoke in terms of the ideal of liberty,
rather than in terms of the original understanding, established traditions, or clear precedents.
21
See, e.g., 438 US at 138-150 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
22
But see the important discussion in David Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court,
available at ssrn.com, arguing that the decisions of the Warren Court fit comfortably within the method of
the common law. It is possible, of course, to believe that certain decisions comport with the common law
method but not with Burkeanism, simply because of their adventurousness (familiar within the common
law but incompatible with Burkeanism).
23
US v. Carolene Products, 304 US 144, 153 n. 4 (1938).
24
A recent effort in this vein is Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty (2005); notably, Breyer favors minimalism
in the sense of small steps, see id. at 69-74, but his effort to develop a theoretical account of constitutional
law makes it difficult to place him in the Burkean camp.
25
The most important exposition is John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1983).
26
410 US 113 (1973).
27
See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 US 39 (1980).
28
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
29
See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (1985). As we shall see, Burkean minimalists might well be
prepared, however, to accept the rulings of the Warren Court even if they would not have joined them as a
matter of first impression.
30
For a concise statement, Thomas Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 Harv J Law and Pub Pol 509 (1996). Charles
Fried, Saying What The Law Is (2004), might well be taken as an elaboration of Burkean minimalism.
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decisions that do not comport with the original understanding, simply because a decision
to overrule them would disrupt established practices. To Burkean minimalists,
originalism looks uncomfortably close to the French Revolution, seeking to overthrow
settled traditions by reference to a theory.31
Nor do Burkean minimalists have any enthusiasm for conservative perfectionism,
which they consider far too rationalistic. To be sure, they are willing to build on existing
law through analogical reasoning, and this process of building might allow Burkean
minimalists to make common cause with their perfectionist adversaries. But insofar as
members of the latter group are willing to invoke ambitious accounts (of, say, property
rights, congressional power over war-making, or color-blindness) to produce large-scale
departures from existing practice and law, Burkean minimalists have no interest in their
enterprise.
I have two goals in this Article. The first is to identify the ingredients of Burkean
minimalism—an approach that has both integrity and coherence, that has played a large
role in the history of American constitutional thought, and that casts some new light on a
number of contemporary disputes. My second goal is to answer a simple question: Under
what assumptions and conditions would Burkean minimalism be most appealing? One of
my central claims is that no approach to constitutional interpretation makes sense in
every possible world. It is certainly possible to imagine times and places in which judges
should reject Burkean minimalism. With respect to racial segregation in the United
States, for example, there has long been a strong argument for a non-Burkean or even
anti-Burkean approach, which Brown v. Bd. of Educ.32 exemplifies. Whether or not
Brown can be defended as minimalist,33 it is not easily characterized as Burkean, simply
because it disrupted an established institution in the name of a theory, involving equality
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See Merrill, supra note, at 512-14.
347 US 483 (1954).
33
Brown could be seen as minimalist, rather than perfectionist, if it is regarded as having built on a series of
decisions, rather than as a bolt from the blue. See the outline of the long line of cases leading to Brown in
Geoffrey Stone et al., Constitutional Law 471-73 (5th ed. 2005). And Brown might even be seen as having a
Burkean dimension if it is taken as having been based on experience, rather than a priori reason. See David
Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, available at ssrn.com. I believe, however, that it is
a stretch to see Brown in Burkean terms, insofar as the decision showed a willingness to uproot a
longstanding institution by reference to an account of racial equality.
32
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on the basis of race.34 In areas in which traditions are unjust and in which judges can
reliably assess them in constitutionally relevant terms, there is reason to reject Burkean
minimalism. Rationalist minimalism, subjecting traditions to critical scrutiny, has played
a large role in the domains of race and sex discrimination; in other areas, there may be an
argument for some kind of perfectionism as well.35
I shall suggest that the case for Burkean minimalism is most plausible when three
conditions are met: (1) originalism would produce unacceptable consequences, (2)
longstanding traditions and practices are trustworthy, or at least trustworthy enough, (3)
there is great reason to be skeptical of the rule-elaborating and theory-building capacities
of federal judges. Those who tend to accept Burkean minimalism—above all Justices
Frankfurter and O’Connor—apparently believe that these three conditions are pervasive.
As we shall see, the argument for Burkean minimalism is extremely strong in the area of
national security, where the Court rightly gives attention to longstanding practices. As we
shall also see, Burkean minimalism bears on a number of unresolved and increasingly
pressing dilemmas in contemporary constitutional law, ranging from the protection of
individual rights to the question of presidential power to the appropriately Burkean
response to non-Burkean, or anti-Burkean, precedents.
II.
A.

Minimalisms
Definitions

1. Narrowness. There are different forms of minimalism, but all of them share a
preference for small steps over large ones. This preference operates along two
dimensions.36 First, minimalists favor rulings that are narrow rather than wide. Narrow
rulings do not venture far beyond the problem at hand; they attempt to focus on the
particulars of the dispute before the Court. When presented with a choice between narrow
and wide rulings, minimalists generally opt for the former. To be sure, the difference
34

It would be possible to see Brown as reflecting no theory, and certainly no a priori theory, but instead a
judgment rooted in experience, to the effect that racial segregation stigmatized or subordinated AfricanAmericans. But even if Brown is so understood, it is hard to justify on Burkean grounds, simply because it
disrupted an entrenched institution.
35
See Ronald Dworkin, Justice In Robes (2006).
36
I explore minimalism in Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in
Robes (2005).
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between narrowness and width is one of degree rather than kind; no one favors rulings
that are limited to people with the same names or initials as those of the litigants before
the Court. But among the reasonable alternatives, minimalists show a persistent
preference for the narrower options, especially in cases at the frontiers of constitutional
law. In such cases, minimalists believe that justices lack relevant information, and they
fear the potentially harmful effects of decisions that reach broadly beyond the case at
hand.37
With respect to the war on terror, for example, the Court has favored narrow
rulings, failing to say anything about the President’s power as Commander-in-Chief and
generally leaving a great deal undecided.38 Or consider the “undue burden” standard in
the area of abortion39—a standard that is rule-free and that calls for close attention to the
details of the particular restriction at issue.40 In the domain of affirmative action, the
Court’s rulings have been insistently particularistic, arguing that while one program is
unacceptable, another one might not be.41
Minimalists fear that wide rulings will produce errors that are at once serious and
difficult to reverse—a particular problem when the stakes are high. Hence it might be
thought that narrowness is especially desirable in any period in which national security is
threatened. Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in The Steel Seizure Case offers the
most elaborate discussion of the basic point.42 Justice Frankfurter emphasized that
“[r]igorous adherence to the narrow scope of the judicial function” is especially important
in constitutional cases when national security is at risk, notwithstanding the national
“eagerness to settle—preferably forever—a specific problem on the basis of the broadest
possible constitutional pronouncement.”43 In his view, the Court’s duty “lies in the
opposite direction,” through judgments that make it unnecessary to consider “delicate

37

See the discussion of privacy in Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty (2005); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems With Minimalism, Stan L Rev (forthcoming 2006).
38
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004); Ex Parte Quirin, 317
US 1 (1942)..
39
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US 833 (1992).
40
Id.
41
See, e.g., Adarand Construction Contractors v. Pena, 515 US 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. Croson,
488 US 469 (1989).
42
343 US at 594-597.
43
Id at 594.
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problems of power under the Constitution.”44 Thus the Court has an obligation “to avoid
putting fetters upon the future by needless pronouncements today.”45 Frankfurter
concluded that “[t]he issue before us can be met, and therefore should be, without
attempting to define the President's powers comprehensively.”46 Frankfurter is arguing
for minimalism on the ground that it reduces the risk that erroneous judicial decisions
will impose undesirable limits on democratic processes.47
In many domains, sensible people take small steps in order to preserve their
options, aware as they are that large steps can have unintended bad consequences,
particularly if they are difficult to reverse.48 In law, wide rulings might produce outcomes
that judges will come to regret. This point derives strength from a special feature of
adjudication, which often grows out of particular disputes based on particular facts.49
Unlike legislators and administrators, judges frequently do not “see” a broad array of fact
patterns, suitable for decision by rule. Lacking information about a range of situations,
judges are often in a poor position to produce wide rulings.
These are points about the risk of error, but there is an additional problem. For
any official, it can be extremely burdensome to generate a wide rule in which it is
possible to have confidence. Narrow decisions might therefore reduce the costs of
decision at the same time that they reduce the costs of error. For the same reason that
standards might be preferred to rules,50 then, narrowness might be preferred to width.
2. Shallowness. Minimalists also seek rulings that are shallow rather than deep.
Shallow rulings attempt to produce rationales and outcomes on which diverse people can
agree, notwithstanding their disagreement on fundamental issues. For example, there are
many disputes about the underlying purpose of the free speech guarantee51: Does the
44

Id at 595.
Id at 596.
46
Id. at 597.
47
In the same vein, see Breyer, supra note, at 69-74 (emphasizing need for cautious, narrow decisions on
questions involving relationship between privacy and modern technologies).
48
See Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure (1996) (stressing the value, in experimental settings, of
attempting of settle social problems by taking small, reversible steps).
49
Admittedly, issues before the Supreme Court are often quite general rather than heavily particularistic, as
for example in cases of broad challenges to statutory restrictions. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558
(2003). One of the distinctive features of Burkean minimalism is an effort to revolve a case in a way that
makes it less general than it might be taken to be.
50
See Louis Kaplow, Rules vs. Standards: An Economic Approach, 42 Duke LJ 557 (1992).
51
See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry (1990).
45
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guarantee aim of protect democratic self-government, or the marketplace of ideas, or
individual autonomy? Minimalists hope not to resolve these disputes. They seek
judgments and rulings that can attract shared support from people who are committed to
one or another of these foundational understandings, or who are unsure about the
foundations of the free speech principle.52
The minimalist preference for shallowness is rooted in three considerations. First,
shallow decisions, no less than narrow ones, simplify the burdens of decision. It can be
extremely difficult to decide on the foundations of an area of constitutional law; shallow
rulings make such decisions unnecessary. Second, shallow rulings may prevent errors. A
judicial judgment in favor of one or another foundational account may well produce
significant mistakes; shallowness is less error-prone, simply by virtue of its agnosticism
on the great issues of the day. If several foundational accounts, or all contenders, can
converge on a rationale or an outcome, there is good reason to believe that it is right.
Third, shallow rulings tend to promote social peace at the same time that they show a
high degree of respect to those who disagree on large questions.53 In a heterogeneous
society, it is generally valuable to assure citizens, to the extent possible, that their own
deepest commitments have not been ruled off-limits. By accomplishing this task, shallow
rulings reduce the intensity of social conflicts.54 This practical point is supplemented by
the fact that those who seek shallowness are demonstrating respect for competing
foundational commitments.55
In the abstract, of course, narrowness and shallowness are nothing to celebrate.
Narrowness is likely to breed unpredictability and perhaps unequal treatment; it might
even do violence to the rule of law.56 In many contexts, rules are preferable to standards,
and it can be worthwhile to risk the overinclusiveness of rules in order to increase clarity,
so as to give people a better signal of their rights and obligations.57 Narrow rulings reduce
the burdens imposed on judges in the case at hand, but they also “export” decisionmaking
52

See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv L Rev 1733 (1993).
John Rawls, Political Liberalism 147-48 (1993)
54
See the discussion of “modus vivendi” liberalism in id. at 146-49 (1993).
55
Of course some such commitments are rightly placed out of bounds as a foundation for law; consider the
commitment to slavery or to oppression of religious minorities.
56
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175 (1989); Sunstein,
Problems With Minimalism, supra note.
57
See Kaplow, supra note.
53
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duties to others, in a way that can increase those burdens in the aggregate. Insofar as
minimalists prize narrowness, they are vulnerable to challenge on the ground that they
leave too much uncertainty in the system.58
Shallowness certainly has its virtues. But if a deep theory is correct, perhaps
judges ought to adopt it. A shallow ruling, one that is agnostic on the right approach to
the Constitution, would seem a major error if a more ambitious approach, though
contentious, is actually correct. Suppose, for example, that a certain theory—of free
speech, the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief, property rights—would
produce the right foundation for future development. If so, there is good reason for courts
to accept it. Minimalists might leave uncertainty about the content of the law at the same
time that they obscure its roots. I will return to these objections below.
B.

Two Kinds of Minimalism

1. Practices and judgments. It is important to distinguish between Burkean
minimalism and its more rationalist counterpart, which might be associated with Justices
Ruth Bader Ginsburg59 and Stephen Breyer.60 Of course Burkeans prize shallowness;
opposition to ambitious theories is part of the defining creed of Burkeanism.61 The more
basic point is that while Burkeans want to base their small steps on established traditions,
rationalists are occasionally skeptical of traditions, and they are willing to ask whether
established practices can survive critical scrutiny.
This difference should not be overstated. No real-world minimalist is likely to
accept all traditions as such. Indeed, there are both conceptual and practical problems

58

See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006).
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 US 515 (1996) (offering theoretical account of problem of sex
discrimination). It is important to be careful with these comparisons. Justice Ginsburg believes in small
steps and has strong Burkean inclinations. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 NC L Rev (1985) (criticizing Roe v. Wade for proceeding too
rapidly).
60
See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty (2005). Justice Breyer, no less than Justice Ginsburg, is respectful of
precedent and has Burkean inclinations -- as reflected, for example, in his emphasis on the need to proceed
slowly and incrementally in the domain of privacy, see id. at 69-74; Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 518 US 727 (1996). But insofar as Breyer emphasizes a
theoretical account for organizing constitutional law, see Active Liberty, supra, at 15-33, his approach is
easily distinguished from that of Justices O’Connor and Frankfurter, who had no such account.
61
See below.
59
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with any effort to take that path.62 No real-world minimalist is likely to be willing to
subject many traditions to critical scrutiny, at least not at the same time. Any such effort
would quickly produce a departure from minimalism. In practice, there is a continuum
from more Burkean to more rationalist forms of minimalism. But it is nonetheless
possible to distinguish between the two sets of minimalists, if only because of their
different emphases, which can lead in radically different directions.63
As it applies to the judiciary, we can understand Burkeanism in two different
ways. First, Burkeans might stress actual social practices, and see those practices, as they
extend over time, as bearing on the proper interpretation of the Constitution. A practiceoriented understanding would be reluctant to invoke a particular understanding of the
separation of powers to strike down a longstanding practice—say, foreign surveillance by
the president, or presidential war-making without congressional authorization.64 On this
view, judges in constitutional cases should follow a distinctive conception of the role of
common law judges, which is to respect and mimic, rather than to evaluate, time-honored
practices.65 In a sense, Burkean courts attempt a delegation of power, from individual
judges to firmly rooted traditions.66 For such Burkeans, ambiguous constitutional
provisions should be understood by reference to such traditions,67 and judges should be
reluctant to allow litigants to challenge them. Indeed, judges might even question
democratic initiatives that reject traditions without very good reason.
Second, Burkeans might stress not social practices but the slow evolution of
judicial doctrine over time—and therefore reject sharp breaks from the judiciary’s own
past. For such Burkeans, what is most important is the judiciary’s prior judgments, which
62

The conceptual problem is that traditions are not self-defining, and hence it is not clear what it means to
“follow” any and all traditions. The practical problem is that traditions often conflict with each other, and
hence following all of them will not be possible. I take these problems up below.
63
Compare, for example, the Court’s emphasis on an “emerging awareness” about the content of liberty in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 556, 572 (2003), with the argument for deference to traditional morality in id.
at 586-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64
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should in turn be based on a series of small steps, and should avoid radical departures.
And on this view, current judges should respect those judgments.
There are large differences between an approach that focuses on social practices
and one that focuses on judicial doctrine. Those who emphasize practices would be
skeptical of evolutionary movements in constitutional law if those movements depend
solely on the judges’ own moral or political judgments, minimalist though they might be.
For Burkeans who emphasize practices, it is not legitimate for judges to build
constitutional law through small steps that reflect the judges’ own judgments over time.
But for those who see the evolution of judge-made constitutional law as an acceptably
Burkean project, judicial steps deserve respect, especially in light of the fact that those
steps are unlikely to depart radically from public convictions.68
2. Burke. Burke himself emphasized social practices rather than judicial
judgments; but he tended to collapse the two.69 I do not attempt anything like an exegesis
of Burke, an exceedingly complex figure, in this space,70 but let us turn briefly to Burke
himself and in particular to his great essay on the French Revolution, in which he rejected
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the revolutionary temperament because of its theoretical ambition.71 Burke’s key claim is
that the “science of constructing a commonwealth, or reforming it, is, like every other
experimental science, not to be taught a priori.”72 To make this argument, Burke opposes
theories and abstractions, developed by individual minds, to traditions, built up by many
minds over long periods. In his most vivid passage, Burke writes:
We wished at the period of the Revolution, and do now wish, to derive all
we possess as an inheritance from our forefathers. . . . The science of
government being therefore so practical in itself, and intended for such
practical purposes, a matter which requires experience, and even more
experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and
observing he may be, it is with infinite caution than any man ought to venture
upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree, for
ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again, without
having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.73
Thus Burke stresses the need to rely on experience, and in particular the
experience of generations; and he objects to “pulling down an edifice,” a metaphor
capturing the understanding of social practices as reflecting the judgments of numerous
people extending over time. It is for this reason that Burke describes the “spirit of
innovation” as “the result of a selfish temper and confined views,”74 and offers the term
“prejudice” as one of enthusiastic approval, noting that “instead of casting away all our
old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree.”75 Emphasizing the critical
importance of stability, Burke adds a reference to “the evils of inconstancy and
versatility, ten thousand times worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest
prejudice.”76
Burke’s sharpest distinction, then, is between established practices and individual
reason. He contends that reasonable citizens, aware of their own limitations, will
effectively delegate decision-making authority to their own traditions. “We are afraid to
put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason,” simply “because we
suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to
71
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avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations, and of ages. Many of our men
of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover
the latent wisdom which prevails in them.”77
Burke’s enthusiasm for traditions, as compared to the private stock of reason, can
be closely linked to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. The Jury Theorem shows that if each
individual in a group is more than 50% likely to be right, the probability that a group will
be right increases to 100% as the size of the group expands.78 Burke appeared to see
traditions as embodying the judgments of many people operating over time. If countless
people have committed themselves to certain practices, then it is indeed probable that
“latent wisdom” will “prevail in them,” at least if most of the relevant people are more
likely to be wrong than right. The fact that a tradition has been able to persist provides an
additional safeguard here; its very persistence might be taken to attest to its wisdom or
functionality, at least as a general rule.
To be sure, it would be possible to object to Burkeanism on the ground that some
traditions might be a product not of wisdom, but of a collective action problem,
significant disparities in power, or some kind of social cascade, in which practices persist
not because people decide independently in favor of them, but because people simply
follow other people.79 This is an important objection to Burkeanism in all its forms, and I
will return to it below.80 For present purposes, the only point is that if many independent
judgments have been made on behalf of a social practice, it may well make sense to adopt
a presumption in its favor.
In light of these claims, it would be possible for Burke to express some skepticism
about the common law, treating it as a form of a priori intervention by unaccountable
officials whose decisions are unrooted in actual experience. But Burke sees his claims as
a reason to value rather than to repudiate the common law, which he goes so far as to call
the “pride of the human intellect.”81 Burke contends that “with all its defects,
77
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redundancies, and errors,” jurisprudence counts as “the collected reason of ages,
combining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human
concerns.”82 Of course jurisprudence lacks a simple theory, and it was hardly constructed
a priori; but it is a product of experience, which is its signal virtue.83 Burke appears to be
seeing the common law as a form of customary law, developing with close reference to
actual practice, which it tends to codify.
3. Burke and judicial review. Burke did not, of course, develop an account of
judicial review; English courts lacked (and lack) the power to strike down legislation, and
hence it would never have occurred to Burke to explore the nature and limits of that
power. Indeed, a faithful Burkean might be tempted to reject judicial review altogether,
perhaps on the ground that judges are too likely to go off on larks of their own. Perhaps
little revolutions, of the kind if not on the scale that Burke despised, are a predictable
product of an independent judiciary entrusted with the power of invalidation. But for
those who sympathize with Burke’s arguments, a Burkean account of judicial review is
not difficult to sketch. The central point is that courts ought to protect time-honored
practices from renovations based on theories, or passions, that show an insufficient
appreciation for them. The goal would be to provide protection against the revolutionary
spirit in democratic legislatures.
Nor is this view at all foreign to American constitutional law. The Due Process
Clause has long been understood in traditionalist terms. In his dissenting opinion in
Lochner, Justice Holmes, though not a Burkean,84 struck an unmistakably Burkean chord
when he wrote that the clause would be violated if “a rational and fair man necessarily
82
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would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”85 The incorporation of the
Bill of Rights had a great deal to do with Burkean thinking, especially insofar as it was
engineered by Justice Frankfurter. Thus Justice Frankfurter explicitly urged that courts
should ask whether proceedings “offend those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples.”86 And in the end, the
incorporation decision has become rooted in a judgment about whether “a particular
procedure is fundamental—whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an AngloAmerican regime of ordered liberty.”87 Of course it would be possible to understand
“ordered liberty” in a priori or purely theoretical terms. But in the account that Justice
Frankfurter spurred, the focus was on “an Anglo-American regime,” which placed the
emphasis squarely on an identifiable tradition.
Much of the time, modern substantive due process has also been undertaken with
close reference to tradition. Justice Harlan’s influential approach was based on “continual
insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the values that
underlie our society . . .”88 More recently, efforts to cabin the use of substantive due
process have been rooted in the suggestion that unless the right in question can claim
traditional protection, courts should not intervene.89 In rejecting the right to physicianassisted suicide, the Court said that substantive due process has been “carefully refined
by concrete examples involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal
tradition”—an approach that “tends to rein in the subjective elements” and that “avoids
the need for complex balancing” in particular cases by fallible judges.90 Thus the Court’s
inquiry was framed by asking “whether this asserted right has any place in our Nation’s
tradition.”91
On this highly Burkean view, growing out of Holmes’ dissenting opinion in
Lochner, the Court should not strike down legislation merely because it offends the
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judges’ account of reason or justice, or even because it is inconsistent with evolving or
current social norms. It is necessary also to show a violation of principles that are at once
longstanding and deeply held. Of course the Court has often refused to follow this
Burkean approach to the Due Process Clause, in a way that has sharply divided Burkeans
on the one hand from rationalist minimalists and perfectionists on the other.92
This latter point suggests the need to make a distinction between two kinds of
Burkean decisions: those that uphold and those that invalidate democratic judgments.
Burkeanism can operate as a shield or a sword. By their very nature, Burkeans should be
sympathetic to efforts, by state and federal governments, to defend established practices
against constitutional attack. If, for example, states are attempting to ban same-sex
relations, to regulate obscenity, or to depart from the idea of one person, one vote, their
decisions might be supported on Burkean grounds.93 When government is acting in a way
that seems to favor a kind of religion belief, Burkeans should not object if that form of
favoritism has clear support in social traditions. Strikingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
defense of the use of the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance is an almost
entirely Burkean exercise, stressing practices rather than reasons for practices.94 If the
President is engaging in action in which presidents have long engaged, and with
congressional acquiescence, Burkeans would be strongly inclined to uphold that action.95
In fact we could easily imagine an endorsement, by many Burkeans, of a kind of
bipartisan restraint, on the theory that decisions about whether to change longstanding
practices should be made democratically, not by judges at all.96
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In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Virginia,97 Justice Scalia spoke in
exactly these terms. He begins by emphasizing that the Virginia Military Institute “has
served the people of the Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and distinction for over a
century and a half.”98 On this view, the longevity of sex segregation at VMI is a good
reason for the Court to stay in its hand. In Justice Scalia’s view, the Burkean point
provides a cautionary note for judges, but not for citizens, who need not be Burkean and
who are entirely free to conclude “that what they took for granted is not so, and to change
their laws accordingly.”99 Justice Scalia concludes that this democratic liberty, to alter
existing practices, is itself time-honored: “So to counterbalance the Court’s criticisms of
our ancestors, let me say a word in their praise: they left us free to change.”100
But it is also possible to use Burkeanism as a sword. If government is
dramatically altering the status quo, Burkeanism might be invoked as the basis for
attacking the attempted alteration. We have seen that the Due Process Clause has been so
invoked.101 This is Holmes’ understanding of substantive due process, as including a
(sharply limited) role for traditional barriers on government behavior. There are
analogues in other domains, where established traditions have also helped to convince
courts to impose limits on what government may do.102 In striking down an unusual
Colorado law that prohibited gays and lesbians from obtaining local antidiscrimination
measures, the Court said, “[i]t is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of
this sort.”103
4. Shallow but wide? In this light, we could identify a Burkean approach to the
Constitution that endorses shallowness while also embracing width and sometimes even
large steps in Burkean directions. Suppose that tradition and experience are the best
sources of constitutional meaning; suppose we agree that under the Due Process Clause
in particular, traditionalism should discipline judicial judgment. Justice Scalia has so
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urged, largely in the interest of width.104 Some Burkeans, insistent on rule of law virtues,
would follow Burke’s skepticism about abstract theories, and particularly about their
deployment by judges, while also rejecting case-by-case particularism. Imagine, for
example, a decision to return to a much narrower understanding of the scope of
substantive due process—a decision that would have to count as a large step insofar as it
would dramatically alter existing law. Or consider the view that public references to God
raise no constitutional problem, simply because such references have been with us for a
long time.105 That view would produce wide judgments, not narrow ones.
We might therefore distinguish between Burkean minimalists who prize
narrowness as well as shallowness, and those ambivalently minimalist Burkeans who
favor width but reject depth. Perhaps sensible Burkeans must reject a static approach to
tradition,106 one that freezes existing practice, especially as circumstances change; but
Burkeanism as such need not forbid width in constitutional law. Interestingly, however,
Justices Frankfurter and O’Connor—leading Burkean minimalists in the nation’s
history—favor narrowness no less than shallowness, on the evident ground that in the
most controversial domains, wide rulings are too likely to produce error.107
5. Burke and rational criticism of traditions. Rationalist minimalists seek
narrowness and shallowness, but they are entirely willing to rethink traditions and
established practices. An underlying idea is that traditions are often unjust and that
society frequently progresses by subjecting them to serious challenge. On this view, the
delegation of decision-making authority to longstanding traditions is perverse, and Burke
was quite wrong to treat “prejudice” as a word of approval.
Consider, for example, the long series of decisions striking down discrimination
on the basis of sex.108 In those decisions, the Court did not act abruptly; it built up the
doctrine by small, incompletely theorized steps. But it could not claim to rest on
traditions. On the contrary, the sex discrimination cases squarely reject Burkeanism by
104
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repeatedly opposing “reasoned analysis” to “traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions
about the proper roles of men and women”109 and to the “accidental byproduct of a
traditional way of thinking about females”110—with the suggestion that laws that are such
“accidental byproducts” are unconstitutional for that very reason.111 Tradition serves in
these cases as a term of opprobrium.112 Indeed, the Court has struck down sex
discrimination on the express ground that it is a product of habit and tradition, rather than
reason, and it has required government to defend any such discrimination in terms that
Burkeans would find puzzling at best.113
Nor can Burkeanism account for the Court’s decisions establishing the right to
vote, including the one-person, one-vote rule114 and even Bush v. Gore115; the doctrine
here developed by increments, with Bush v. Gore explicitly noting its own
minimalism,116 but the Court hardly built on traditions. Indeed, the rise of the one person,
one-vote rule was originally criticized on heavily Burkean grounds, with the suggestion
that the Court was allowing a contentious theory to override longstanding practices.117
More recently, the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,118 striking down the ban on
same-sex sodomy, is a good illustration of rationalist minimalism.119 In Lawrence, the
Court did not and could not claim that its decision was securely rooted in longstanding
traditions. On the contrary, the Court emphasized an “emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives
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in matters pertaining to sex.”120 Hence the Court looked forward to what was emerging,
not backward to what was long settled. There could be no question that the endorsement
and characterization of this “emerging awareness” was affected by the Court’s own
evaluative judgments.
In many areas, the Supreme Court has acted in common law fashion, but in a way
that is sharply critical of traditions121 and that looks toward to a constitutionally preferred
future. Indeed, much of equal protection doctrine is forward-looking in this sense, rooted
as it is in a norm of equality that operates as a challenge to longstanding practices.122
Establishment Clause doctrine has a similar feature, with history often creating problems
for the Court’s attempt to elaborate a theory of neutrality.123 Rationalist minimalists are
willing to conclude that entrenched traditions might reflect power, confusion, accident,
and injustice, rather than hard-won wisdom and sense.124 And it should be no surprise
that Justice O’Connor, with her Burkean inclinations, refused to join the Court’s opinion
in Lawrence, simply because the Court was overruling its own fairly recent decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick.125
Of course Justice O’Connor has occasionally been willing to subject traditions to
critical scrutiny.126 But there is a strong Burkean strand in her opinions, insisting on the
need to look to practice and experience, rather than to anything like abstract theory.
Indeed, her opinion upholding an affirmative action program at the University of
Michigan Law School emphasized the extent to which race-conscious programs had
become part of the practice of businesses and even the military.127 Hence the validation
of such programs could be seen as reflecting an unwillingness to use an abstract theory—
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based on the idea of color-blindness—as the foundation of an attack on actual practices,
vindicated by experience.
6. Traditions in packages? At this point the distinction between Burkean and
rationalist minimalism might be challenged on the ground that traditions do not come in
neat packages for judicial identification. Traditions are hardly self-defining, and this
point severely complicates the Burkean enterprise. When a court attempts to follow a
tradition, what, exactly, is it supposed to follow? Should a tradition be characterized at a
high level of generality (involving, say, respect for intimate personal choices) or a low
level (involving, say, government interference with such choices when traditional
morality is being violated)? When circumstances change—as a result, for example, of the
rise of terrorism—how should be characterize a “tradition” of limited presidential
prerogatives?
Perhaps Burkean minimalists must ultimately turn out to be rationalists, in the
sense that any particular account of tradition must ultimately be their own, and based on
their “private stock of reason.” Perhaps the resulting account will have an evaluative
dimension.128 On this view, any characterization of a tradition will have to be
interpretive, in the sense that it will be a matter of placing longstanding practices in what
judges deem to be a sensible light.129 Some people contend that traditions should be read
at a high level of generality, so as to contain certain abstractions that might then be used
to test, and find wanting, particular practices, even longstanding ones.130 If traditions are
so used, changes might be sought not in spite of traditions but in their name. If so, the
distinction between Burkean and rationalist minimalism begins to vanish. For this reason,
the Burkean approach might have an inevitable rationalist dimension, one that is
obscured by traditionalist talk.131
Burkeans have two responses. First, they might acknowledge this point and urge
simply that their Burkeanism is fully consistent with it. Burke himself believed that
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traditions were far from static.132 His claim was that social change should emerge from
traditions, not in opposition to them. If this is the central point, the line between Burkean
and rationalist minimalism does become thinner. But perhaps we can thicken it. Perhaps
Burkeans will want to adopt a presumption in favor of democratic outcomes—an
inclination that divides Justice Frankfurter, who adopted such a presumption,133 from
Justice O’Connor, who did not.134 On this view, the best understanding of Burkean
minimalism ensures that courts will infrequently strike down legislation, unless that
legislation is palpably inconsistent with traditions or defies the unmistakable lessons of
experience.135 If this is so, the difference between Burkeans and rationalist minimalists is
that members of the latter group are far more willing to invoke their own moral and
political arguments to invalidate legislation.
This view cannot be supported by Burkeanism alone; it supplements Burkean
claims with democratic ones. The central idea is that in a democratic society, judges
should invalidate legislation only when it amounts to a clear violation of the document,
read with close reference to longstanding practices.136 In the American context, many
people might be willing to insist that judges should be reluctant to strike legislation down
on the basis of their own convictions, while also claiming that citizens in the democratic
process should usually feel free to invoke those convictions in order to challenge
longstanding practices. In short, Burkeanism for judges, nonBurkeanism for citizens, with
the particular suggestion that judicial review should rarely be exercised by reference to
the “private stock of reason.” If citizens and their representatives are permitted to offer
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their own interpretations of the Constitution137—at least when they are expanding and not
contracting rights as established by the courts—perhaps they can understand the
document in a nonBurkean way, even while judges are held to traditions.
Second, Burkeans might insist on reading traditions at a low level of abstraction,
in a way that will minimize the theory-building and tradition-characterizing duties of the
judiciary.138 Justice Scalia, emphasizing deference to tradition, points to the need to
consider “the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”139 This approach promotes width at the
same time it denies judges the power “to consult and if possible reason from, the
traditions . . . in general.”140 By rejecting that power, and by distrusting the effort to
“reason from” tradition, Justice Scalia is squarely embracing a Burkean approach to the
role of the Court in constitutional cases; he is reading the Due Process Clause so as to
delegate authority to the tradition, rather than to authorize judges to use tradition as a
foundation for normative arguments of their own. If it is stipulated that traditions should
be read at a low level of abstraction, then it is genuinely possible to follow them, rather
than to characterize them.
Here, then, is a sharp difference between Burkean and rationalist minimalists,
who are entirely willing to “reason from” traditions.141 Burkean minimalists, on this
view, would be reluctant to create new rights, such as the right to physician-assisted
suicide,142 whereas more rationalist, less Burkean minimalists might well be willing to do
so. Burkeans applaud their rationalist adversaries for their insistence on small steps, but
they are skeptical of their willingness to create new rights. If the Burkean position is to be
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defended, it is on the ground that traditions are more reliable than individual judges,
relying on their private stock of reason.143
It should be apparent that insofar as Burkean minimalists adopt either a
presumption in favor of democratic processes or an insistence on reading traditions at a
low level of generality, they become less minimalist, simply because they reject
narrowness in constitutional doctrine and begin to convert the doctrine into a system of
rules. And indeed we could imagine a Burkean who favors both shallowness and width,
the latter perhaps in the service of the former. I will return to this point below.
III.

The Conditions for Burkean Minimalism

No approach to constitutional law makes sense in every imaginable context. The
Constitution does not offer a manual of instructions for its own interpretation, and hence
the choice of a theory of interpretation very much depends on judgments about the
institutional capacities of courts and legislatures.144
Take, for example, the dispute between those who favor textualist approaches and
those who believe that courts should stress purpose rather than text.145 We can imagine
circumstances in which one or another approach makes best sense. If textualism would
lead to greater before-the-fact care from legislators, and also to rapid after-the-fact
corrections, the argument for textualism would be greatly fortified; so too if courts would
blunder if they resorted to purpose. But if textualism would often lead to unintended
absurdity, and if courts could discern purpose both quickly and accurately, the argument
for purposivism would be much strengthened. In short, the choice between textualism and
purposivism rests in large part on judgments about institutional capacities,146 and these
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judgments cannot be made in the abstract.147 What works well in one legal system, or in
one time or place, may not do so in another. Something similar is true for constitutional
interpretation, and it helps to illuminate the argument between Burkean minimalists and
their adversaries.
A. Originalists and Burkeans
1. Possible worlds. Burkeans reject originalism, but it is possible to imagine a
world in which originalism would be worth pursuing. Suppose, for example, that the
original public meaning of the document would generally or always produce sensible
results; that violations of the original public meaning would be unjust or otherwise
unacceptable; that democratic judgments that did not violate the original public meaning
would almost always conform, at the outset or fairly soon, to the right understanding of
human rights; and that judges, not following the original public meaning, would produce
terrible blunders from the appropriate point of view. In such a world, originalism would
be the best approach to follow. The reason is that originalism would impose a desirable
discipline on the judiciary, preventing it from making terrible blunders, at the same time
that it would serve as near-perfect safeguard against injustice, rights violations, or
otherwise unacceptable results. What could possibly be wrong with originalism in a
world of this kind, or even in a world that is close to it?
It follows that there is no abstract argument against originalism. If originalism
would produce the best results on balance,148 as compared with the alternatives, the
argument for originalism would be very powerful.149 In our world, the strongest objection
to originalism is that it would greatly unsettle existing rights and institutions, in a way
that would make American constitutional law worse rather than better.150 Burkean
minimalists reject originalism for that reason; they believe that originalists are in the grip
of an abstract theory, one that would do away with a kind of inheritance. That inheritance
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takes the form of numerous judicial judgments over long periods of time, in which public
commitments have lead to constitutional rulings that diverge from the original
understanding.
When Burkeans recoil at the suggestion that the founding document should be
understood to mean what it originally meant, they are embracing a conception of the
Constitution as evolving in the same way as traditions and the common law—not through
the idiosyncratic judgments of individual judges, but through a process in which social
norms and practices play the key role.151 It is in this vein that Justice Frankfurter
contended, “It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon them.”152
Consider, for example, the question whether a congressional declaration of war is
a necessary precursor to the use of force by the President. From the constitutional text,
read in light of its history, there is a plausible argument to this effect.153 The argument is
controversial,154 but let us simply stipulate that on the original understanding, the
President may not use force without a declaration of war. On Burkean grounds, there is a
serious difficulty with judicial insistence on this idea: Since the founding, the United
States has been involved in over two hundred armed conflicts, and Congress has declared
war on only five occasions.155 Longstanding practice is inconsistent with the original
understanding, and Burkeans insist that those practices must operate as a “gloss” on the
document.
At a minimum, Burkeans will notice that a congressional authorization to use
force has operated as the functional equivalent of a declaration of war, and they will
contend that such an authorization gives the President the same power accorded by a
declaration.156 But Burkeans will add that if the President has often gone to war with
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neither a declaration nor an authorization, constitutional law must give some attention to
that fact—and at least consider the possibility that for some military actions,
congressional authorization is not required at all. The example could easily be extended
to many cases in which social practices, and judicial decisions, have outrun the original
understanding. For example, the question of foreign surveillance by the President might
be analyzed in just this way.157
2. Originalist rejoinders. To their Burkean adversaries, originalists have two
possible responses. First, they might accept the claims of stare decisis and social
traditions and acknowledge that much of the time, established doctrines and practices
must be accepted, whatever the content of the original understanding. Justice Scalia has
described himself as a “faint-hearted” originalist158; his faint-heartedness consists in his
unwillingness to use the original understanding as a kind of all-purpose weapon against
existing law and practices. On this count, Justice Scalia is very different from Justice
Thomas, who is not so faint of heart. Justice Scalia has said that Justice Thomas “doesn’t
believe in stare decisis, period.”159 Justice Scalia remarks, “if a constitutional authority is
wrong, [Justice Thomas] would say, ‘Let’s get it right.’ I wouldn’t do that.”160 The line
between Burkean minimalism and faint-hearted originalism might well turn out to be thin
in practice. The question is under exactly what conditions originalists will prove faint of
heart; the answer turns on the weight to be given to precedents and practices. If
originalists are extremely faint-hearted, they will usually agree with their Burkean
counterparts.
The second response, offered by originalists to Burkean minimalists, is far more
interesting. Originalists might well claim that the doctrines to which they most
strenuously object are not, in fact, a product of slowly evolving judgments, firmly rooted
in social practices and generally fitting the Burkean model of constitutional change. On
this view, presidential power to make war or to engage in foreign surveillance may well
be legitimate, if either is actually rooted in decisions extending over time; but judicial
invention of baseless constitutional rights is not. Burkeans might argue that the most
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objectionable doctrines are a product of a kind of (French?) revolution, in which the
Supreme Court, above all under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, was
captured by a theory that was at once contentious and radical.161 Perhaps the Court was
paying insufficient attention to social practices, which it repeatedly rejected; perhaps its
own reasoning was, in the end, a priori, and not securely rooted in either precedent or
practice.162 It is not at all clear that committed Burkeans must or should treat such a
revolution as the established backdrop for constitutional law—just as it is not clear that
after an illegitimate revolution, a Burkean polity should build on the revolution, rather
than attempting a kind of restoration.
3. Contexts. I have noted that both Justice Frankfurter and O’Connor can be
characterized as Burkean minimalists, but it is here that there are noteworthy differences
between the two, stemming from the dramatically different contexts in which they sat on
the Supreme Court. For Justice Frankfurter, sitting at the inception of the Warren Court,
social practices were taken to deserve respect, and Burkean minimalism raised a series of
cautionary notes about the liberal initiatives of that Court, which he often rejected.163 For
Justice O’Connor, sitting long after the Warren Court, Burkean minimalism operated to
insulate those initiatives from significant or immediate revision.164 This difference raises
a number of questions about the appropriately Burkean response to a non-Burkean, or
anti-Burkean, period in constitutional history.
On one view, the essential fallacy of a Burkean understanding of contemporary
constitutional law is that it creates a ratchet effect, in which Burkeans end up having to
“conserve” the aggressive and tradition-rejecting decisions of the Warren Court.
Compare the question whether the Supreme Court, in the late 1930s, should have taken a
Burkean approach to the body of doctrine that emerged from the Lochner era, including
protection of freedom of contract165 and restrictions on national power under the
161

A counterargument can be found in David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court,
available at ssrn.com
162
But see id.
163
West Virginia State Bd of Educ v. Barnette, 319 US 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Baker
v. Carr, 369 US 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., joined by Harlan, J., dissenting).
164
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 US 833 (1992). Casey of course
preserved Roe v. Wade, a decision of the Burger Court rather than the Warren Court; but Roe is
appropriately placed within the general line of doctrine that the Warren Court inaugurated, see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
165
See, e.g., Lochner v. NY, 198 US 45 (1905); Adkins v. Childrens’ Hospital, 261 US 525 (1923).
30

commerce clause.166 When the Court has built up a body of doctrine that is
constitutionally unmoored, perhaps any effort at conservation is not properly
characterized as Burkean at all. Perhaps the Court’s post-New Deal rejection of Lochner
era decisions, in sweeping rulings not easily regarded as minimalist,167 can be understood
as a plausibly Burkean effort to return to traditions after a period characterized by an
illegitimate judicial role (or rule).
If this point is right, Burkeans might well accept the Court’s wholesale rejection
of much of its jurisprudence between 1905 and 1935.168 And if this is so, it would be
possible to think that on Burkean grounds, Justice Frankfurter was right in his insistence
on stability but that Justice O’Connor was wrong in hers. To be sure, the (by hypothesis)
illegitimate decisions might deserve respect if respect is necessary to protect established
expectations or ensure against a large-scale social upheaval. But on Burkean grounds,
there is no reason for a presumption on behalf of illegitimacy, even if it has persisted for
decades.
I believe that a dispute on these questions helps to illuminate the division between
contemporary Burkean minimalists, most notably Justice O’Connor, and the less fainthearted originalists, most notably Justice Thomas. Burkean minimalists would be most
unlikely to have joined all of the controversial decisions of the Warren Court; but they
might be willing to accept some or even most of them in the interest of stability. The
argument for doing so is strengthened if those controversial decisions can indeed be seen
to have emerged from an acceptably Burkean process of case-by-case evolution, closely
attentive to social norms and practices.169 On that count, originalists are skeptical.
In this dispute, the strongest Burkean point, against originalism, involves the risks
associated with wholesale disruption of contemporary constitutional law, containing
understandings of rights and institutions on which people have come to rely. In the
domain of institutions, the Court’s validation of independent regulatory agencies is the
simplest example.170 In the domain of rights, prominent examples include the rule of one
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person, one vote171 and the prohibition on school prayer.172 Many of the rights-protecting
decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts, with dubious Burkean roots, have now
become entrenched as a social matter,173 though it is certainly true that the same cannot
be said of all such decisions.174
B. Perfectionists and Burkeans
Perfectionists believe that it is appropriate for federal judges to cast constitutional
ideals in the best constructive light.175 Of course they do not believe that judges can
legitimately create the Constitution anew; their job involves interpretation, not rewriting.
Hence judges owe a duty of fidelity to text, precedent, and all other relevant sources of
law. But to the extent that fidelity permits, judges are entitled and even required to
develop a principle that best justifies an area of law.176 If, for example, a propertyprotective view of the Takings Clause177 puts that clause in its best constructive light,
perfectionists believe that the Court should adopt that view, except to the extent that it is
in palpable tension with existing doctrine.178 If a democracy-centered understanding of
the first amendment makes best sense of the free speech guarantee,179 then the Court
should adopt that understanding to the extent that it can be made to fit with existing law.
Burkeans distrust abstract or a priori reasoning, and hence they will be deeply
skeptical of any approach of this sort. Indeed, they might be willing to defend their own
approach on the ground that Burkean minimalism both fits and justifies our practices, and
hence defeats perfectionism under its own criteria. On this view, Burkean minimalism
can be understood as a kind of second-order perfectionism—that is, a form of
perfectionism that is alert to the institutional weaknesses of the federal judiciary, and that
171

See Reynolds v. Simms, supra note.
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962).
173
See Michael McConnell, Book Review, Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006).
174
Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973), is the most obvious source of controversy here.
175
The applicable theory can be found in Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1985). I put to one side the
many complexities in Dworkin’s account.
176
Id.
177
See Richard Epstein, Takings (1985).
178
Of course there are hard questions about how courts should “trade off” fit and justification – as, for
example, by selecting (among the reasonable alternatives) an approach that does somewhat less well along
the dimension of fit but better along the dimension of justification.
179
See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (1948); Stephen Breyer,
Active Liberty (2005).
172

32

therefore refuses to pursue perfectionism directly. That very refusal may help to perfect
constitutional democracy, because it produces an account of interpretation that minimizes
theory-building demands on the federal judiciary.
Perhaps it is true that in order to be defended, any approach to constitutional law
must ultimately fit and justify our practices. But it may also be true that in view of the
limitations of federal courts, particularly in the domain of moral and political argument,
judges do best if they defer to traditions, rather than attempting to evaluate them on their
own. As I have suggested, Burkean minimalism reflects a kind of delegation principle, in
which judges grant law-interpreting authority not to regulatory agencies,180 but to
longstanding practices. An idea of this kind lies close to the heart of Burke’s own view,
with his suggestion that if reason and wisdom are the goals, the best way to achieve them
is to avoid a priori thinking and to defer to traditions, even those taken as to reflect
prejudices.181
Certainly the argument for (first-order) perfectionism, and the attack on
Burkeanism, would be strengthened if we were entitled to have real confidence in the
theory-building capacities of federal judges.182 Even then, the argument would not be
airtight. Democratic skeptics might object that judicial perfection of constitutional ideals
would threaten the right to self-government.183 Perhaps that concern could be
accommodated through the right theory of interpretation, which would, by hypothesis,
give self-government its due.184 Burkean skeptics might also worry that perfectionists
would encounter serious pragmatic problems. By attempting to engraft their preferred
theories onto actual societies, judicial efforts might turn out to be futile or
counterproductive, simply because societies would resist those efforts.185 But if a theory
that fits our practices is indeed appealing in principle, and if courts can elaborate and
implement it, perhaps they should do so.186
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Some people do not take this possibility seriously. They believe, for example, that
a perfectionist approach is forbidden by the very idea of “interpretation,”187 or that
considerations of legitimacy are by themselves sufficient to rule perfectionism out of
bounds.188 But the Constitution does not set out the instructions for its own interpretation,
and so long as the Court is respecting the text, which is after all what has been ratified,
many different approaches fit within the boundaries set by the general idea of
interpretation. Among the plausible possibilities, a great deal depends on judgments
about institutional capacities.189 It should be obvious that the argument for theoretical
ambition from the federal judiciary would be strengthened if there is reason to trust not
only the good will but also the capacities of theoretically ambitious judges.
It is here, of course, that Burkean minimalists depart from perfectionists. Because
they are Burkeans, such minimalists distrust theoretical ambition as such. They are most
unlikely to have confidence in judges with large theoretical ambitions; in the Burkean
view, such judges suffer from hubris. To the extent that judges are entrusted with power,
it is because of their willingness and ability to elaborate the Constitution’s text, read in
light of society’s traditions and practices. Whether the theorists are concerned to
vindicate property rights, or a democratic conception of the free speech principle, or the
abstract ideal of color blindness, the Burkean minimalist firmly opposes them.190 The
opposition is based on the belief that perfectionism, unpromising even in the political
domain, is a most unlikely foundation for judicial judgment.
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C. Burkeans and Rationalists: Are We the Ancients?
Suppose that we are trying to decide between the two forms of minimalism:
Burkean and rationalist. On what assumptions should we choose the former? Much of the
answer depends on what we agree with Burke. If established traditions reflect wisdom
rather than accident and force, Burkean minimalism gains force. Perhaps a state wants to
ban obscene material; perhaps speakers object that existing constitutional doctrine can be
understood to establish a principle of individual autonomy, one that does not permit
government to ban adults from reading and viewing whatever they want.191 If we believe
that the traditional practice, authorizing the ban, is likely to embody wisdom, we might
want courts to uphold it, whatever individual autonomy seems to require.192
In the same vein, Burkeans would want the Court to permit “ceremonial deism,” in
the form of public recognition of religious beliefs; when a constitutional challenge is
raised against ceremonial deism, Burkeans reject the challenge largely by reference to
traditions.193 The same analysis would suggest that courts should have permitted
deviations from the one person-one vote rule.194 Burkean minimalists would want courts
to avoid the “political thicket,” not because they believe in judicial abstinence as such,
but because they think that established practices of political representation deserve
respect even if it is not easy to produce a theory to defend them. Speaking of morality
generally, ethicist Leon Kass contends that in some domains, “we intuit and feel,
immediately and without argument, the violation of things that we rightfully hold
dear.”195 For those who believe that judges ought not to challenge what “we intuit and
feel, immediately and without argument,” Burkean minimalism has considerable
appeal.196
By contrast, rationalist minimalists are willing to listen to the claim that in some
domains, the Court ought to call traditions to account, and should be willing to
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generalize, from its own precedents, principles that operate as a sharp constraint on
government. As we have seen, the ban on sex discrimination emerged from this process
of generalization.197 In that context in particular, it is difficult to defend the view that
longstanding practices reflect wisdom and sense rather than power and oppression. Some
theories of the Establishment Clause produce sharp critiques of longstanding practices,
based as they are on accounts of neutrality that jeopardize a number of traditions.198
Rationalist minimalists are willing not only to impose fresh barriers in this way, but also
to permit the government to develop new accounts of what it legitimately does—accounts
that might produce considerable novelty in the form, for example, of an expanded
conception of the police power.199
Justice Holmes can be seen as an originator of a Burkean approach to the Due
Process Clause, but he was far more pragmatist than Burkean: “It is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”200 In his Lochner dissent,
Holmes insisted that “the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or
novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.”201 Holmes’
key point, a deeply anti-Burkean one, is that whether we find opinions “natural and
familiar” is itself an “accident” of our time and place. There could be no clearer rejection
of Burke’s suggestion that our “prejudices” are a reflection not of accident but of hardwon wisdom.202
The Federalist No. 1, with its explicit preference for “reflection and choice” over
“accident and force,” makes a similar point.203 Consider too the words of James Madison,
writing in a very young America: “Is it not the glory of the people of America, that,
whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations,
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they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to
overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation,
and the lessons of their own experience?” In Madison’s account, Americans
“accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They
reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe."204
These are largely rhetorical passages, but there is actually an argument in the
background. Thomas Jefferson captured that claim with his objection that some people
“ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human,” and his response
that the age of the founders “was very like the present, but without the experience of the
present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of bookreading.”205 Jefferson is contending that current generations have more experience than
past generations; in that sense, they have lived longer. Burkeans tend to cherish the
wisdom of those long dead, but their stock of wisdom was far more limited than ours. In
the same vein, Pascal contended that we are the ancients: “Those whom we call ancient
were really new in all things, and properly constituted the infancy of mankind; and as we
have joined to their knowledge the experience of the centuries which have followed them,
it is in ourselves that we should find this antiquity that we revere in others.”206
These arguments turn chronology against Burke, not by attempting to vindicate a
priori reason, but by suggesting that if experience is our guide, the present has large
advantages over the past. A similar idea might be found in the Court’s suggestion, when
invalidating a ban on same-sex sodomy, that what is crucial is not ancient practice, but
“an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”207
But if their focus is on the Supreme Court, Burkean minimalists need not insist
that respect for longstanding traditions always makes sense in the political domain.
Focusing on courts in particular, Burkean minimalists might plead agnosticism on the
proper treatment of traditions in democratic processes, and contend more modestly that
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their approach is distinctly well-adapted to the institutional strengths and weaknesses of
the federal judiciary. For judges, the question is an insistently comparative one. It is not
whether traditions are good, or great, in the abstract. It is whether tradition-tethered
judges are better than judges who think that they ought to subject traditions to critical
scrutiny. Burkean minimalists believe that traditions are the best available guide.
We should now be able to see the conditions under which Burkean minimalism
makes most sense. Suppose, first, that originalism would produce intolerable results, in
part because it would be too destabilizing. Suppose, second, that we have reason to
distrust the theory-building capacities of judges, so that perfectionism is out of bounds.
Suppose, finally, that in general or in particular areas, traditions and established practices
are more reliable than the results that would be produced by minimalists who are willing
to subject those traditions and practices to critical scrutiny. When these conditions are
met, the argument for Burkean minimalism has considerable force.
No approach to the Constitution makes sense in all contexts or in every
imaginable world. In our world, Burkean minimalism has clear advantages over
originalism. It also has clear advantages over perfectionism of any kind insofar as there is
reason to distrust the theory-building powers of federal judges, and to think that most of
the time, longstanding practices are likely to make some sense, or at least enough so to
stand against judicial scrutiny. The contest between Burkean minimalism and its
rationalist sibling is much closer. Under some constitutional provisions, above all the
Equal Protection Clause, the Burkean approach is hard or perhaps even impossible to
square with entrenched understandings in American constitutional law—and hence turns
out to be self-contradictory. A form of rationalism, allowing challenges to certain forms
of discrimination, is part of the fabric of constitutional law.208 An equally serious
problem is that for some forms of discrimination, it is exceedingly difficult to argue that
longstanding traditions reflect wisdom, rather than power and injustice. Here the
argument for a form of rationalism, subjecting traditions to critical scrutiny, is quite
powerful.
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But in other domains, the Burkean approach can claim both to be consistent with
existing law and to operate it a way that imposes appropriate discipline on judicial
judgments. In the area of national security, for example, Burkean minimalism has had a
major role, as the Court has proceeded via small steps and with close attention to
institutional practices extending over time.209 Justice Frankfurter offered the clearest
statement of the Burkean position, with his suggestion that “a systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution . . .
may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President.”210 In the context
of national security, the Jeffersonian challenge, emphasizing social learning over time, is
least likely to support an aggressive judicial role against the elected branches, simply
because this is a domain in which judicial expertise is unlikely.211
A controversial application of this claim would be a suggestion that the President
does indeed have the inherent power to engage in foreign surveillance—ensuring that he
may do so long as Congress has not said otherwise, and raising the possibility that he
may do so even if Congress requires him to follow a specified procedure.212 Without
engaging the complex questions on their merits, let us simply stipulate that the President
has long engaged in such surveillance and that it is not simple to find a constitutional
provision giving him the “inherent” power to do so.213 If this is so, the legal question is
whether the longstanding practice legitimately produces a “gloss” on Article II,
permitting the President to engage in the relevant conduct, certainly in the face of
congressional silence and perhaps even overriding congressional will. This is not a
simple question to answer, and for that reason the Burkean minimalist would want to
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avoid it. Such a minimalist would seek, to the extent possible, to understand existing
legislation in a way that conforms to the President’s claim of a “gloss.”214
I do not mean to offer a particular answer here. But at the very least, a Burkean
approach to such questions deserves respectful consideration, above all when the stakes
are large and when courts lack relevant information.
D. The Burkean Dilemma
As I have suggested, Burkean minimalism is likely to run into serious problems
whenever the legal system has operated, for a significant period, on premises that
Burkeans would reject. If an area of the law has been developed on perfectionist grounds,
Burkeans might be tempted to abandon it, perhaps immediately; so too if rationalist
minimalism has dominated a particular area of the law. But even more than most,
Burkean minimalists respect the demands of stare decisis, believing as they do that
entrenched decisions may well embody wisdom and that new departures are likely to
have unanticipated adverse consequences. Burkeanism might even risk self-contradiction
insofar as it confronts an area of law that has long operated on non-Burkean grounds.
Burkean minimalists have no simple way out of this dilemma.215 It is certainly
reasonable for Burkeans to conclude that their best option is to respect the existing
decisions but to attempt to confine them, limiting the extension of rulings that fall within
the camp of perfectionism or rationalist minimalism.216 On this view, courts should not
build on decisions lacking roots in longstanding traditions; they might narrow them
without overruling them. It is easy to see how Burkeans might be drawn to this way of
dealing with Roe v. Wade.217 But it would not be out of bounds for Burkeans to conclude
that the most indefensible departures from their preferred method must be sharply
cabined or even overruled, at least if it is possible to do so without greatly disrupting
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reasonable expectations or undoing a great deal of the fabric of existing law. Committed
Burkeans might well take this approach to Roe.
More generally, many of the most vigorous disputes in contemporary
constitutional law involve the proper resolution of this dilemma.218 Recall that the same
dilemma can be found in the aftermath of the Lochner era, in which the Court did not
take a minimalist approach, but on the contrary issued ambitious rulings that did away
with decades of decisions.219 If these ambitious rulings were justified on Burkean
grounds or otherwise, it was simply because there was no legitimate basis for the
decisions that preceded them—an especially severe problem in light of the fact that those
decisions imposed serious obstacles to democratic initiatives.
If the decisions of the New Deal and Warren Courts deserve to be treated with
more respect, it is because many of those decisions respect democratic prerogatives,220
and because many others have a strong claim to legitimacy, not least because they did not
come as bolts from the blue. Perhaps the Court’s rulings could claim a foundation in a
nonBurkean approach of one or another sort, calling for judicial deference to political
judgments221 or for a democracy-reinforcing approach to judicial review.222 Perhaps the
Court’s rulings were sufficiently rooted in prevailing social commitments or in ordinary
processes of case-by-case judgment.223 A final assessment of the question of legitimacy
must depend on the merits. But an adequate way out of the Burkean dilemma cannot
avoid making some such assessment.
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Conclusion
Burkean minimalism offers a distinctive approach to constitutional law. Like
other minimalists, Burkeans value narrow, incompletely theorized rulings and thus reject
both width and depth. What Burkeans add is an emphasis on the need to develop law with
close reference to established practices and traditions, and a corresponding distrust of
judicial judgments that are not firmly rooted in longstanding experience. In the history of
the Supreme Court, Justices Frankfurter and O’Connor have been the most consistent
practitioners of Burkean minimalism. Of course there are large differences between the
two. Most notably, Justice Frankfurter sat during the early stages of the Warren Court,
many of whose initiatives he attempted to resist; Justice O’Connor sat in the aftermath of
the Warren Court, many of whose initiatives she attempted to preserve. Committed
Burkeans might plausibly endorse Justice Frankfurter’s efforts at resistance while
questioning Justice O’Connor’s efforts at preservation.
It is also reasonable to accept one half of Burkean minimalism—to endorse
shallowness and to resist theoretical ambition, while also insisting that rule-bound
judgments often make a great deal of sense.224 It is certainly possible to endorse a
Burkean conception of the judicial role while rejecting a Burkean approach to politics in
general. This position would be defended on the ground that while Burkeanism is a
helpful way of disciplining judges, citizens require no such discipline.
One of my major claims has been that no theory of constitutional interpretation makes
sense in every imaginable context. I have concluded that the argument for
Burkean minimalism is stronger in some domains than in others; it has least force
in cases involving official discrimination, and far more power in the area of
separation of powers. But the central point is much broader. Where originalism
would produce unacceptable consequences, where traditions and longstanding
practices deserve respect, and where there is reason to distrust the theory-building
capacities of federal judges, Burkean minimalism has a legitimate and enduring
claim on our attention.
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